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„Smerdjakov’s suicide note, like everything he says, has a touch of 
semiliterate about it and is not quite grammatical“. This is how Victor 
Terras comments on Smerdjakov’s last words in his Karamazov 
companion (Terras 1981. 397). Victor Terras’ comment is an understate-
ment: besides grammatical awkwardness, there is also a well-calculated 
ambiguity in Smerdjakov’s note, which contains two messages – one of 
them intended for his half-brother and former spiritual tutor, Ivan 
Karamazov, and the other for the general public. 
The exact wording of the note is: „Истребляю свою жизнь своею 
собственною волей и охотой, чтобы никого не винить“ (PSS 15. 85, 
22f). Its first reading is reflected in the English translation of Constance 
Garnett: „I destroy my life of my own will and desire, so as to throw no 
blame on anyone“ (BK Garnett, 346). In this reading, the note is perfectly 
grammatical, although somehow pleonastic („своею собственною волей 
и охотой“). This is probably the interpretation adopted automatically by 
most readers of Dostoevskij’s Russian original. In the world of the novel, 
however, this reading is accessible exclusively to Smerdjakov’s half-
brother Ivan, since he is the only person to know that the servant holds 
him responsible for the killing of their father Fedor Pavlovič. In his 
interviews with Ivan, Smerdjakov had constantly invoked the common 
ground allegedly shared by him and his half-brother, thereby creating a 
sense of false familiarity between them. His suicide note is a last move in 
this game: by packing into it a meaning that is decodable only for Ivan, 
Smerdjakov manages even beyond his death to preserve the atmosphere 
of conspiracy that links him to his half-brother.  
For those who believe Smerdjakov to have passed the night of the 
murder in bed next to the room of Grigorij and Marfa, paralysed by an 
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epileptic fit (this is the majority of the novel’s characters), the only 
possible reading is the one reflected in the translation of David Magar-
shak: ‘I put an end to my life of my own free will and no one should be 
blamed for it.’ (BK Magarshak, 766). Translated thus, Smerdjakov’s 
words are quite typical of suicide notes of the time, as shown by two 
examples from Irina Paperno’s book on Suicide as a Cultural Institution 
in Dostoevsky’s Russia: Я написал бы „в смерти моей никого не 
винить,“ – но чувствую, что эта стереотипная фраза мне не к лицу; 
Избитая фраза: в смерти никого не винить, отправился на тот свет 
по собственному желанию (Paperno 1997. 274, 277; emphasis added). 
Dostoevsky uses this stereotype in Stavrogin’s suicide note: Никого не 
винить, я сам (PSS 10. 516. 4f). 
If we follow the first reading of the note, чтобы introduces a final 
clause directly subordinated to the main clause Истребляю свою жизнь 
своею обственною волей и охотой. The causal connection holds 
between the propositional content of the two clauses: Smerdjakov kills 
himself because he does not want to blame on Ivan his killing of Fedor 
Pavlovič. Чтобы functions here as a semantic connective. If we follow 
the second reading, the final clause introduced by чтобы modifies not the 
propositional content of the first clause, but the speech act that Smerdja-
kov performs by writing it down. The meaning of the note becomes clear 
if we imagine Smerdjakov introducing it by an overt performative like 
Заявляю, что...: I leave this message because I do not want anybody to be 
accused of murdering me. In this case, чтобы is a pragmatic connective 
(Van Dijk 1979): it links not one proposition to another, but a speech act 
to a proposition. Another way to put this would be to say that in the 
second reading, there is between the first and the second clause of  
Smerdjakov’s suicide note a shift from the communicative to the 
metacommunicative level, with чтобы serving as a bridge between them. 
This type of pragmatic connection is not uncommon in Russian; here 
are some examples from contemporary usage (source: Padučeva 1985. 
46): Где Иван, а то им начальство интересовалось; Если хочет, я там 
вообще не был; Пока я не забыл, куда ты положил словари? Чтобы 
не спутать, в котором часу завтра собрание? There are also many 
interesting examples in Dostoevskij’s work. In The Idiot, Ferdyščenko 
speaks the following words to Count Myškin: Я пришел вас 
предупредить: во-первых, мне денег взаймы не давать, потому что я 
непременно буду просить (PSS 8. 79. 44f). This example offers  a nice 
illustration of the mechanism underlying the passage from the semantic to 
the pragmatic use of connectives: if we discard the introductory phrase Я 
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пришел вас предупредить, i.e. if we view мне денег взаймы не давать 
not as a complement to предупредить, but as an autonomous modal 
infinitive („don’t lend me money“), the connective потому что must be 
interpreted pragmatically. Our next example is from Snegirev’s first 
dialogue with Aleša: Нет, однако, мог возбудить столь любопытства, 
ибо живу в обстановке, невозможной для гостеприимства (PSS 14. 
182. 9f). Again, the meaning becomes clear if we supply the missing 
performative „Since I am not in a position to receive guests, I ask you 
why you have called on me“. Ivan’s interviews with Smerdjakov provide 
us with two more examples of pragmatic connectives: Я завтра в Москву 
уезжаю, если хочешь это знать (PSS 14. 249. 40; spoken by Ivan 
Karamazov to Smerdjakov) and Ан вот вы-то и убили, коль так (PSS 
15. 59. 25; spoken by Smerdjakov to Ivan Karamazov). All cases occur in 
dialogues, which is probably no coincidence: the construction has a 
distinctly colloquial ring to it.  
To almost all of the novel’s characters, it is the second and not the 
first reading of Smerdjakov’s suicide note that makes more sense. But this 
reading, preferable as it may be from a logical point of view, poses a 
grammatical problem: the zero subject of the infinitive винить has the 
wrong controller (or rather no controller at all). The subject of the 
underlying performative phrase is the author of the note (i.e. Smerdja-
kov), the subject of винить the people who could (and should not) accuse 
somebody else of his alleged murder. This is why Smerdjakov’s suicide 
note sounds „not quite grammatical“ – not just to Victor Terras, whose 
statement was quoted at the beginning of this paper, but also to the public 
prosecutor Ippolit Kirillovič (PSS 15. 141, 21-25): Повесившись, 
оставил записку, писанную своеобразным слогом: „Истребляю себя 
своею волей и охотой, чтобы никого не винить“. Ippolit Kirillovič 
goes on: Ну что б ему прибавить в записке: убийца я, а не Карамазов. 
Но этого он не прибавил: на одно совести хватило, а на другое нет? 
The public prosecutor’s remark makes clear another aspect of the 
meaning of Smerdjakov’s suicide note: in its second reading, it triggers 
the inference (the implicature) that Smerdjakov is not the murderer; and 
this, in turn, implies that he holds somebody else responsible for the 
killing of Fedor Pavlovič.
1 
Thus, the second reading of Smerdjakov’s 
suicide is not just distinct, but in fact quite opposed to the first: the first 
denies its autor’s wish to blame anybody, the second is an indirect 
accusation. 
                                                 
1
 This has been already noted by Morson 1986. 240. 




The peculiarity of Smerdjakov’s suicide note stands out even more clearly 
if we compare it to the note Dmitrij Karamazov holds out to Petr Il’ič 
Perxotin just before his departure for Mokroe: „Казню себя за всю 
жизнь, всю жизнь мою наказую!“ (PSS 14. 364. 12). This note consists 
of two clauses, too, but the logical relation between them is quite 
transparent: the second clause repeats the content of the first. The fact that 
Dmitrij calls his note a „riddle“ is just one more proof of his naivety. 
Compared to Smerdjakov’s, this note has nothing mysterious about it, and 
its translation poses no particular problems: the English versions of 
Garnett and Magarshak agree with each other almost word for word: „I 
punish myself for my whole life; my whole life I punish!“ (BK Garnett, 
213); „I’m punishing myself for my whole life, my whole life I punish!“ 
(BK Magarshak, 474). On the other side, the chiastic arrangement of the 
key words (казню ... жизнь ... жизнь ... наказую)  and the rhythmic 
texture give Dmitrij’s note a certain poetic flavour that is the exact 
opposite of the bureaucratic clumsiness in Smerdjakov’s last words.  
The insidious ambiguity of Smerdjakov’s suicide note and the 
bragging despair of Dmitrij’s are both perfect expressions of their 
character. Both notes were certainly composed very carefully by 
Dostoevskij, who was an avid reader and an astute analyst of suicide 
notes (Paperno 1997, Shneidman 1984). There is no doubt that the 
ambiguity of Smerdjakov’s note was intended by the author of the novel. 
But are we to believe that it entered Smerdjakov’s intentions as well? 
It would be rash to answer this question only in the affirmative. 
Smerdjakov „embodies“, according to G. S. Morson, „anomaly to all 
possible systems“ (Morson 1986. 234). An aspect of this anomaly is that 
it is difficult, if not impossible to draw a sharp line between what he does 
intentionally and what happens to him by accident. His epilepsy attack in 
the night of the murder (first feigned, then real) is a pertinent case in 
point. True, Smerdjakov shows a remarkable „ability to manipulate 
language“: he „simply outmaneuvers Ivan in their verbal duels“ (Morson 
1986. 240). But here again, he can feel manipulated, too, because it was 
in the first place Ivan who made him, a person of exemplary honesty up to 
then, consider murder and theft as permissible.
2
 
So let us leave the question of intentionality open and limit ourselves 
to the observation that already at his first appearance in the novel, 
                                                 
2
 The „duality of voices“ inherent in many of Smerdjakov’s words has recently been 
pointed out by Lee Johnson (2004. 77f). 
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Smerdjakov betrays a preoccupation with the linguistic mechanism that 
he (be it consciously or unconsciously) exploits in his last words. Chapter 
7 of Book Three is called Контроверза. In this chapter, the two servants 
of Fedor Pavlovič, Grigorij (Vasil’evič Kutuzov) and (Pavel Fedorovič) 
Smerdjakov, argue about a Russian soldier who was taken prisoner in 
Asia and had rather preferred to be flayed alive than to renounce his 
Christian faith. Smerdjakov refuses to recognize the value of the soldier’s 
act of martyrdom and supports his point with a whole array of arguments. 
In fact, he goes even so far as to contend that renouncing Jesus Christ in 
this situation would be no sin at all. The way by which he arrives to this 
strange conclusion is quite remarkable: Ибо едва только я скажу 
мучителям: „Нет, я не христианин и истинного бога моего 
проклинаю“, как тотчас же я самым высшим божьим судом 
немедленно и специально становлюсь анафема проклят и от церкви 
святой отлучен совершенно как бы иноязычником, так даже, что в 
тот же миг-с – не то что как только произнесу, а только что помыслю 
произнести, так что даже самой четверти  секунды тут не пройдет-с, 
как я отлучен, – так или не так, Григорий Васильевич? […] А коли я 
уж не христианин, то, значит, я и не солгал мучителям, когда они 
спрашивали: „Христианин я или не христианин“, ибо я уже был 
самим богом совлечен моего христианства, по причине одного лишь 
замысла и прежде чем даже слово успел мое молвить мучителям 
(PSS 14. 118, 25-33; 119, 16-20). 
In J. R. Searle’s well-known classification of speech acts, the 
utterance „Нет, я не христианин и истинного бога моего проклинаю“ 
is a declaration. Declarations are speech acts „which effect immediate 
changes in the institutional state of affairs and which tend to rely on 
elaborate extra-linguistic institutions“, e.g. excommunicating, declaring 
war, christening, firing from employment (Levinson 1983.  240). In other 
words, a declaration is a proposition that can (under the appropriate 
circumstances) acquire a positive truth value just by virtue of being 
uttered – a speech act whose propositional content is the speech act itself. 
Smerdjakov’s fallacy rests on the assumption that this unity is only 
apparent: he suggests that in the speaker’s mind, the proposition predates 
the speech act. By this sleight of hand, Smerdjakov manages to transform 
the declaration into a representative utterance, i.e. into a simple factual 
statement. The same kind of reasoning is at work in his suicide note, in 
which the final clause чтобы не винить никого acquires a completely 
different meaning according to whether it is connected to the speech act 
or to the propositional content of the preceding clause. In his argument 
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with Grigorij, Smerjakov artificially separates a speech act from its 
propositional content to build a fallacious argument; in his suicide note, 
he (deliberately?) overlooks their separation to produce an ambiguous 
utterance. 
The analogy between Smerdjakov’s argumentation in the Chapter 
Контроверза and his suicide note can be supported by two more 
arguments. The first of them is that, on the symbolic level, the 
renouncement of Christ can be considered as spiritual suicide. The second 
argument has to do with the fact that there is after all a reading that does 
away with the ambiguity of Smerdjakov’s suicide note: we could regard 
истребляю as a performative verb. Then, the suicide note becomes an 
explicit performative utterance, and the possibility to add yet another 
performative with which the connective чтобы could be linked 
disappears. Of course, this means to transform Smerdjakov into a kind of 
supernatural being who is able to kill somebody (including himself) just 
by the force of his word – an idea that contradicts the fact that he was 
found hanged but that seems not so far fetched after all if we remember 
his close connection with Ivan’s devil. Thus, the explicit performative 
utterance Нет, я не христианин и истинного бога моего проклинаю 
prefigures the suicide note because renouncement of faith is a kind of 
spiritual suicide, and the suicide note harks back to the renouncement 
formula since it is so built that it can be disambiguated only at the cost of 
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